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The history of ‘Dumbarton Oaks’ is overshadowed in the formation of the postwar
order, most notably by the San Francisco conference of April 1945 that gave birth
to the United Nations Organisation. Yet in a number of important ways it was the
Dumbarton Oaks conference, or the ‘Washington Conversations on International
Peace and Security Organization’ to give it its full and formal title, that fundamen-
tally shaped a ‘postwar international organisation’. In other words, the United
Nations that has been an omnipresent feature of international aﬀairs since 1945
owes a considerable debt to the gathering in the late summer and early autumn of
1944 in Washington DC. The conversations took place in stressed circumstances,
with the ongoing military campaigns,1 individual national interests, and competing
viewpoints on a new international organization in the aftermath of the League of
Nations all inﬂuencing the proceedings. Nonetheless all present understood the
opportunity that existed. That the United Nations Organisation has had a mixed
record since should not cloud assessments of the scale of the achievement at
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1 The military situation from August–October 1944 was pressing: the Allies failed with Operation
Market Garden in the Netherlands to break through on the Western front; Soviet forces were unable or
unwilling to offer support to the Warsaw uprising, leaving the Poles to face Nazi Germany’s reprisals in
the city; in the Pacific, US forces were meeting strong resistance from Japanese forces. If the outcome of
the war was fairly certain, the end of the war was – militarily – still some way off in the autumn of 1944.
Dumbarton Oaks to produce a meaningful blueprint for a new form of global
governance.
Dumbarton Oaks’ place in the panoply of wartime conferences has suﬀered
in comparison with other UN-related gatherings such as Bretton Woods and
Hot Springs that led to more readily identiﬁable results. Dumbarton Oaks, in
contrast, was an interim meeting on the way to something bigger, a ‘pre-summit
meeting’.2 The value of the accounts of Dumbarton Oaks presented here is that
they reveal the essential wider context and the broader implications to those policy
negotiations. It was the practical policy outcomes that were so important to the
delegates from the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States as
they gathered in their secluded Washington surroundings from 21 August to 28
September (the Chinese nationalist delegation joined the second phase of the con-
versations from 29 September to 8 October). The articles collected here indicate
how the scope of those talks had a profound inﬂuence on how national interests
both shaped and were shaped by the development of a new structure for global
governance.
This special issue of the Journal of Contemporary History addresses the signiﬁ-
cance of those meetings in the Georgetown suburbs of Washington DC for the
history of global governance. The Dumbarton Oaks estate provided a suitable
retreat for the delegates in 1944 who deliberated on the future international organ-
ization. The estate had been donated to Harvard University by the Republican
career diplomat, Robert Woods Bliss, and his wife Mildred in 1940 for use as a
research institute primarily devoted to Byzantine and other ancient cultures. The
Bliss’s explicit purpose, inscribed in a plaque adorning the building to this day, was
that by exploring the past it would help ‘clarify an everchanging present and to
inform the future with wisdom’. Such a mantra underpins the reappraisals pre-
sented here.
Previous explorations of Dumbarton Oaks have been limited in both focus and
scope. The narrative of the United Nations Organization typically begins with the
Conference in San Francisco in the aftermath of Franklin Roosevelt’s death, on the
verge of Victory in Europe Day (8 May).3 Much of the literature on the Second
World War, and separately the Cold War overlooks the links between strategic
military and political thinking that came together at Dumbarton Oaks. This was a
panoptical diplomatic moment, with the participating delegates simultaneously
looking in all directions. It was a critical juncture in connecting the pre-war, war-
time and postwar eras.
The relative absence of Dumbarton Oaks from literatures on the Second World
War and the Cold War is surprising. It is worth noting its twin conference, Bretton
Woods, or ‘The United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference’ (1–22 July
2 See Jan Melissen, ‘Summit Diplomacy Coming of Age’, Discussion Papers in Diplomacy,
Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, 2006.
3 Franklin Roosevelt’s individual endeavours to shape the postwar world have received attention, see
for instance J. Lamberton Harper, The Cold War (Oxford 2011); F. Costigliola, Roosevelt’s Lost
Alliances: How Personal Politics helped start the Cold War (Princeton, NJ 2012).
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1944), has received far greater attention in recent scholarship, with extensive stu-
dies of both the main protagonists and the wider diplomatic and policy implica-
tions.4 This can partly be explained by the relative success of Bretton Woods in
laying the groundwork for a stable postwar global economy with the USA at its
centre, as opposed to Dumbarton Oaks that is associated with the failure of the
subsequent United Nations to establish an equally stable international political
framework. Nevertheless, this should not undermine historical investigation of
the Washington Conversations as a seminal moment for framing international
security and global governance, and one that should not be solely coloured by
the Cold War. Is the historical record exhausted?
The oﬃcial record of US involvement in Dumbarton Oaks can be found in the
Foreign Relations of the United States series, published in 1966.5 Since then,
Dumbarton Oaks has only received occasional interest from international histor-
ians. Robert Hilderbrand’s 1990 book, Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United
Nations and the Search for Postwar Security, places considerable emphasis on post-
war security and the United Nations.6 Written at the end of the Cold War, it is a
detailed account of the negotiations between the protagonists. However,
Hilderbrand’s account is now almost 30 years old. Likewise, Ernest May and
Angeliki E. Laiou’s collection of conference proceedings commemorating the 50th
anniversary of Dumbarton Oaks is more than 20 years old. Like Hilderbrand, it
reﬂects the post-Cold War moment of the 1990s, calling on contributors to re-eval-
uate the conference’s signiﬁcance without the weight of ColdWar divisions clouding
the analysis. A more holistic view of wartime planning was provided by Georg
Schild, who combined his study of Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks to argue
that US views of postwar security should be viewed simultaneously in both economic
and political terms.7 Dumbarton Oaks makes a signiﬁcant appearance in a number
of broader survey pieces, but equally is overlooked in others. It is treated with some
depth in Robert Dallek’s unparalleled grand study of FDR’s foreign policy in
4 B. Steil, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of
a New World Order (Princeton, NJ 2013); E. Conway, The Summit: The Biggest Battle of the Second
World War (London 2014); E. Rauchway, The Moneymakers: How Roosevelt and Keynes ended the
Depression, Defeated Fascism, and Secured a Prosperous Peace (New York, NY 2015); E. Helleiner,
Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods – International Development and the Making of the Postwar
Order (Ithaca, NY 2015); G. Scott-Smith and J.S. Rofe (eds), Global Perspectives on the Bretton Woods
Conference and the Post-War World Order (New York, NY 2017); N. Lamoreaux and I. Shapiro (eds),
The Bretton Woods Agreement together with Scholarly Commentaries and Essential Historical Documents
(New Haven, CT forthcoming).
5 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, General, Vol. 1 (Washington DC:
US Government Printing Office, 1966), available at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1944v01 (accessed 11 December 2017). As of 2019, the Documentary History series of the FDR
presidency has not produced a volume on the origins of the UN or the Dumbarton Oaks conference,
although a volume on Bretton Woods has been released: G. McJimsey (ed), Documentary History of the
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency, Vol. 40: The Bretton Woods Conference, 1944 (New York, NY 2008).
6 R.C. Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar
Security (Chapel Hill, NC 1990).
7 G. Schild, Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks: American Economic and Political Postwar Planning
in the Summer of 1944 (New York, NY 1996).
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focusing upon the President’s proposal for the ‘Four Policemen’.8 Andrew Preston’s
comprehensive look at religion and foreign policy also includes a section on philo-
sopher Reinhold Niebuhr’s realism, and the skepticism he shared with foreign policy
advisor John Foster Dulles over the workability of an international peace organiza-
tion in a selﬁsh world.9 On the other hand, Dumbarton Oaks is absent from Frank
Ninkovich’s Modernity and Power and Andrew Bacevich’s studies of American
empire and the American Century.10 Neither does it surface in Norman
Graebner’s collection of essays from the 1980s on America as a world power or in
the most recent edition of Stephen Ambrose’s (with Douglas Brinkley) Rise to
Globalism.11 Scattered articles have appeared over the years, and memoirs
have added more details to the historical record, but the literature is still relatively
thin.12
The articles collected here present new directions for exploring the historical sig-
niﬁcance of the Dumbarton Oaks moment. First, there is the issue of periodization.
Recent historical writing has challenged the neat book-ends of 1945 and 1989 for the
Cold War, and the Dumbarton Oaks conference can likewise be situated within an
emerging international history that transcends the interwar, world war, and Cold
War periodisations. This provides a new context for the conference which recognizes
the ‘moment’ that existed in August 1944 for strategic thinking about the future amid
the fulcrum of global conﬂict.13 Second, there is a decentring of the US role as the
central player in international history. Whereas this has taken place in Cold War
histories authored by the likes of Odd Arne Westad and Lorenz Luthi, the articles
here push the process further back to emphasise the important involvement of others
– particularly the Soviet Union, and, with China, what would become the non-
aligned nations – in deﬁning terms and outlining pathways for the future
8 Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (Oxford 1979), 466–
67, 478–79, 507–508.
9 Andrew Preston, Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy (New
York 2012), 352–401.
10 Frank Ninkovich, Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century
(Chicago 1994); Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S.
Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA 2002).
11 Norman A. Graebner, America as a World Power: A Realist Appraisal from Wilson to Reagan
(Wilmington 1984); Stephen A. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign
Policy Since 1938 (9th rev. edn. 2010).
12 See for instance S. Bradshaw Fay, ‘The Dumbarton Oaks Conference’, Current History, 7 (1944)
257–64; E. Borchward, ‘The Dumbarton Oaks Conference’, American Journal of International Law, 39
(1945) 97–101; A. Roshsnin, ‘The Dumbarton Oaks Conference’, International Affairs, 25 (1979) 67–74;
C. Bohlen, Witness to History 1929–1969 (New York, NY 1973).
13 For recent works that explore this transition period, see P. Clavin, Securing the World Economy:
The Reinvention of the League of Nations 1920–1926 (Oxford 2013). In addition to Clavin, recent works
that have contributed to this reappraisal include B. Keys, Globalizing Sport: National Rivalry and
International Community in the 1930s (Cambridge, MA 2006); M. Mazower, No Enchanted Palace
(Princeton, NJ 2008); Z. Steiner, The Triumph of the Dark: European International History 1933–1939
(Oxford 2011); D. Gorman, The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s (Cambridge 2012);
K. Rietzler, ‘Before the Cultural Cold Wars: American Philanthropy and Cultural Diplomacy in the
Interwar Years’, Historical Research, 84 (February 2011), 148–64; J. Hart, Empire of Ideas: The Origins
of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York, NY 2013).
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international order.14 Third, there is the intermestic angle. US public opinion had to
be acclimatised to another venture for setting the terms for world order, following
what has often been perceived as the failed Wilsonian gambit of 1918–20.15 The US
government could not step outwithout ensuring that the American public – read, the
electorate – was on board.16 Fourth, there is the issue of the global impact. Similar to
Versailles 25 years earlier, the negotiations of Dumbarton Oaks were followed by
many around the world who were not present but who had a deﬁnite stake in, and
opinion on, how the postwar world should be transformed and organised. Gender
and racial equality were very much an issue, in terms not only of the future of the
European empires but also of who was deciding on that future.17 The Washington
Conversations resonated far beyond their Washington DC location as Stefanie
Wichhart explores here. Lastly, there is the institutional history. Dumbarton Oaks
laid out a blueprint for a global international organization that would be ﬁnalized at
San Francisco over eight months later. The security challenges of the postwar world,
particularly once the anti-fascist coalition broke into opposing spheres of inﬂuence,
forced the nascentUN to adopt, in diﬃcult circumstances, a role that was diminished
from the one envisaged at Dumbarton Oaks. Nevertheless, those who ran the UN
adapted to these diﬃcult circumstances in order to give meaning, purpose, and
identity to the new organization in world politics.18
Any reappraisal of the signiﬁcance of Dumbarton Oaks must take into account
not only the clash of realist and idealist interests involved, but also how they were
combined within a vision of international order. A realist perspective that focuses
on states’ self-interest,19 sees only the predominance of Great Powers. Those who
had led the United Nations forces against the Axis powers – the United States, the
Soviet Union, Great Britain, along with the secondary power of China – dominated
14 O.A. Westad, Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times
(Cambridge 2005); L. Luthi, The Regional Cold Wars in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East:
Crucial Periods and Turning Points (Stanford, CA 2015).
15 See Ashley Cox, Wilsonian Approaches to American Conflicts: From the War of 1812 to the First
Gulf War (New York 2017).
16 See A. Johnstone, Against Immediate Evil: American Internationalists and the Four Freedoms on the
Eve of World War II (Ithaca, NY 2014) and A. Johnstone, Dilemmas of Internationalism: The American
Association for the United Nations and US Foreign Policy, 1941–1948 (Abingdon 2009).
17 See the work of the Center for International Studies and Diplomacy entitled ‘Women and the UN
Charter’, https://www.soas.ac.uk/cisd/research/women-and-the-un-charter/ (accessed 11 December
2017); E. Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of
Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford 2007); P. von Eschen, Race against Empire: Black Americans and
Anticolonialism 1937–1957 (Ithaca, NY 1997), 75.
18 The UN is gathering more attention within the recent trend of research on the role of international
organisations in international history. See Sandrine Kott, ‘Les organisations internationales, terrains
d’e´tude de la globalisation. Jalons pour une approche socio-historique’, Special Issue of Critique
Internationale 3 (2011); Alanna O’Malley, The Diplomacy of Decolonisation: America, Britain, and the
UN during the Congo Crisis 1960–1964 (Manchester 2018); Giles Scott-Smith, ‘Competing
Internationalisms: The United States, Britain, and the Formation of the United Nations Information
Organization during World War II’, International Journal of History, Culture and Modernity 6 (2018).
19 Literature on ‘Realism’ in International Relations is plentiful with Keohane and Waltz featuring
most prominently. Amongst the most accessible accounts is Scott Burchills’ chapter in ‘Theories of
International Relations’ (5th Edition, New York 2013), 57–87.
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the process. George Kennan wrote from Moscow to US Secretary of State Cordell
Hull that a realistic foreign policy must prevail; ‘we must not fail the people of the
Western nations with UN plans from Dumbarton Oaks that failed to occupy
ourselves seriously and minutely with the sheer power relationships of the
European peoples.’20 It is instructive to recall that at the same time the
Washington Conversations were occurring, FDR and Churchill were meeting at
their last bilateral summit, the second Quebec conference. For four days in
September, this meeting, code-named Octagon, focused on hard-headed postwar
topics like occupation zones in defeated Germany and the Morgenthau Plan for the
‘pastoralization’ and demilitarisation of Germany, as well as on strategic decisions
about the ongoing war in Europe and Asia. Following Quebec, Churchill and
Roosevelt met at the President’s home in Hyde Park, New York to collaborate
on the atomic bomb, and did so in secret, as representatives of two Great Powers
practicing traditional secret diplomacy. Two days after the conclusion of the
Dumbarton Oaks talks, Churchill travelled for a ten-day visit with Stalin for the
fourth Moscow meeting, the ‘Tolstoy Conference’, to deal not only with Soviet
entry into the war against Japan but also about the future of Poland. Most
famously, the two realist statesmen sketched postwar spheres of inﬂuence in
Eastern Europe through their infamous ‘naughty document’, in Churchill’s
words, otherwise known as the ‘percentages agreement’, that divided the region
between Great Britain and the USSR.21
Dumbarton Oaks itself was not a sideshow in this theatre of formal and infor-
mal great power summits. After all, the most famous occurrence during the con-
ference was the request by Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Andrei
Gromyko, for the seating of all Soviet Republics in the postwar security organiza-
tion. That bombshell has been interpreted by some as an expression of Russian fear
of being outnumbered by the capitalists after the war. After all, the British had
their dominions and the Americans could muster their western hemisphere neigh-
bours to vote their way. Stalin needed obedience from some reliable bloc, and thus
he had Gromyko issue his bold demand, one that nearly derailed the negotiations
before a compromise deal was made later to his satisfaction. This was a harbinger
of things to come, and indicated a great power divide that had been conspicuously
absent at Bretton Woods.22
Such a hard-nosed approach was perhaps unsurprising given that as the
Conversations began, military matters were still to the fore. The ferocity of the
ﬁghting as the Allies made progress through Northern France, on the Eastern front
(most tragically in the Warsaw uprising), and in the Paciﬁc as US Forces island-
hopped their way towards Japan, fundamentally challenged thinking on a peaceful
20 David J. Stone, War Summits: The Meetings That Shaped World War II and the Postwar World
(Washington, DC 2005), 179.
21 Eugene L. Rasor, Winston S. Churchill, 1874–1965: A Comprehensive Historiography and
Bibliography (2nd edn. Santa Barbara 2000), 269.
22 See Vladimir Pechatnov, ‘The Soviet Union and the Bretton Woods Conference’, in Scott-Smith
and Rofe (eds.), Global Perspectives on the Bretton Woods Conference, 89–107.
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post-war world. The context for Dumbarton Oaks, in other words, included war
and its spoils. Idealism was not foremost in the minds of leaders as the war ground
on, and as big powers eyed territory for future proﬁt, inﬂuence, and security. The
idealism of achieving a breakthrough for a new institutional framework for global
governance was therefore severely tempered by realist goals on the ground.
The articles that follow here recognise this tension between the ideal of a United
Nations and one governed by balance of power politics amongst the Great Powers.
Stephen Wertheim presents the case that the emergent United Nations
Organisation was a means to facilitate US leadership of a ‘postwar world’. In
making this argument Wertheim ties together two important dimensions of the
postwar world, US foreign policy and the importance of domestic public opinion.
Conditioned by the experience of the American public’s reaction after the First
World War, policy makers wanted to ensure that US postwar leadership would be
accepted, if not welcomed.
Andrew Johnstone’s article further augments our historical understanding of the
role of US public opinion. His article addresses the concerted but distinct eﬀorts of
US oﬃcials and unoﬃcial private internationalists to present Dumbarton Oaks to
the American public. The eﬀorts to educate public opinion revealed tensions in
both government circles and among private internationalist bodies over diﬀering
interpretations of how the international organization sketched at Dumbarton Oaks
would function.
While these two articles have a US focus, Geoﬀrey Robert’s article draws upon
previously unavailable sources to reveal Soviet thinking on an international organ-
ization that was framed around postwar collaboration of the Great Powers. It
exposes the inﬂuence of Soviet foreign commissar Vyacheslav Molotov in relation
to Josef Stalin, and points to the former’s consideration of a uniﬁed Germany and
possibilities for a pan-European collective security system.
An equally innovative approach is provided by Stefanie Wichhart’s analysis of
the inﬂuence of Dumbarton Oaks upon the formation of the Arab League in
March 1945 through the Alexandria Protocol. The inspiration to pursue a pan-
Arab nationalist cause by those gathered in Egypt can clearly be sourced back to
the negotiations that took place in the Washington suburb the previous year.
Drawing upon Arab sources alongside those from Britain and the United States,
Wichhart’s analysis points to how small, medium and regional powers saw poten-
tial in the unfolding international organization. Disappointment with the short-
term outcome of Dumbarton Oaks manifested itself in Arab approaches in San
Francisco and to overall frustration with the United Nations as the Cold War took
hold later in the 1940s.
Moving attention to the internal mechanisms of the future organization, Robbie
Barnes focuses upon the shape of the Secretariat and the Secretary General as con-
ceived in 1944 and how it later faced its ﬁrst substantial security challenge in the case
of the KoreanWar. The distance between what was proposed in 1944 and the reality
of a United Nations, which failed to maintain great power cooperation into the
postwar world, becomes evident here. Equally, exploiting the absence of great
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power dialogue in the United Nations, the ﬁrst Secretary-General Trygve Lie estab-
lished eﬀorts for postwar reconstruction in Korea through the UN Commission for
the Uniﬁcation and Rehabilitation of Korea and the UN Korean Reconstruction
Agency, which set a precedent for subsequent UN endeavours.
These articles provide a reappraisal of the Dumbarton Oaks moment 75 years
on, positioning it within a broader international historical context than has up till
now been the case. In doing so they contribute to the ongoing revisionism in UN
history, reinterpreting the origins of this much maligned but nevertheless essential
apparatus for international diplomacy.23
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